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Abstract - Polifics, Markets, and America’s Schools is an ambitious book that draws eclectically on 
concepts from political science, the sociology of organizations and educational learning theory. Chubb 
and Moe employ an extensive array of data seeking to link the mechanisms that control school 
operations to student achievement. They conclude that a total restructuring of the governance system of 
American education -from democratic to market control -is necessary. Our review scrutinizes a set 
of critical decisions made by Chubb and Moe in defining their key concepts and in the analytical models 
employed in this research. We argue that many of these decisions are not justified on either theoretical 
or methodological grounds. Moreover, the cumulative effect of the decision tends to tilt the empirical 
evidence toward supporting the authors’ a priori beliefs. As a result, we conclude that Politics, Markets, 
and America’s Schools is best viewed as a policy argument, where extensive, but not always solid 
empirical evidence has been artfully employed to advance the authors’ preconceived notions about 
American schooling. 
. . . 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A QUICK SCAN of Politics, Markets, and America’s 
Schools suggests an impressive book. Over the 
course of some 300 pages, John Chubb and Terry 
Moe craft an empirically grounded argument 
demonstrating that how a school is governed influ- 
ences its internal operations which in turn affects 
student learning. Opening with a discussion of 
popular ideas for understanding the current malaise 
of American education, the authors proceed in 
Chapter 2 to lay out an alternative conceptualization 
which is based on an institutional perspective on 
schools. They premise their theorizing on past 
research which has demonstrated that bad schools 
have weak organizational properties. They reason 
that, “If one really believes that schools are open 
systems (a common claim), bad organizational 
properties must be understood as symptoms rather 
than causes. The fundamental causes are probably 
in the environment, and it is there that theory and 
research on school effectiveness ought to focus” (p, 
19). Ultimately, this provides the rationale for 
scrutinizing school governance. 
The basic argument - that the root of America’s 
educational problems are in the democratic control 
of schooling - is supported by an extensive array of 
empirical evidence in Chapters 3,4 and 5. Chapter 3 
documents that the organization of high and low 
performing schools is quite different. Effective 
schools having clearer goals, better leadership, more 
emphasis on academic coursework and a higher 
level of teacher collegiality, influence and status. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the effective 
organizational properties identified in the previous 
chapter are linked to students’ academic perform- 
ance. The argument culminates in Chapter 5, where 
Chubb and Moe muster evidence that the key 
predictor of effective organization is school 
autonomy, and the critical determinant of school 
autonomy is whether the school is private (i.e. 
subject to market control) or public (i.e. demo- 
cratically controlled). Ergo markets should replace 
democratic control of schools. 
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The goals of Politics, Markets, and America’s 
Schools are extensive. From a theoretical per- 
spective, the book draws eclectically on concepts 
from political science, the sociology of organizations 
and educational learning theory in seeking to link 
school controlto student achievement. Empirically, 
these constructs are operationalized with data from 
a large national survey of high schools and students, 
High School and Beyond (HS&B), and a special 
Administrator and Teacher Supplement (ATS). The 
construction of measures and statistical analyses 
were among the more extensive encountered in 
educational research. From a policy perspective, the 
book’s aims are also sweeping. The authors argue 
that nothing less than a total restructuring of the 
American education system - from democratic 
control of public education to a market system - 
will suffice to redress current problems. 
The authors should be applauded at the very least 
for their ambition. By virtue of the book’s intent, 
and the media coverage that has surrounded this 
intent, the authors have certainly captured public 
attention. We believe, however, that the book falls 
considerably short of its stated aims. From a purely 
scientific perspective, we doubt whether, having 
gained the public’s attention, Chubb and Moe really 
have much to say that is new. In our view, Politics, 
Markets, and America’s Schools is best viewed as a 
policy argument, where extensive, but not always 
solid, empirical evidence has been artfully 
employed, to advance the authors’ preconceived 
notions about American schooling. 
The breadth of conceptualizing and wide scope of 
the empirical detail covered in this book pose a 
serious challenge to the critic. At best, a review such 
as this can select a few (hopefully important) points 
from this much larger tapestry for scrutiny and 
comment. We focus our remarks on a combination 
of technical and conceptual decisions about the key 
concepts in the study - student performance, 
school organization, and external control - that, 
we believe, materially affect the authors’ 
conclusions. ’ 
2. CONCEPTUAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE CHUBB AND MOE ANALYSES 
In the course of such a complex study as this, 
researchers routinely make hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of technical decisions about matters such 
as variable construction, sample definition, analytic 
approach and selection of results during report 
writing. If this process is guided by appropriate 
theory and constrained by established method- 
ological practices, we can assume that while some 
decisions may favor the theory under study, others 
are likely to work against it. Overall, we expect a 
fair test of the basic propositions under investi- 
gation. 
On the other hand, if researchers are inclined to 
craft and defend a particular argument, these 
numerous decisions can often be shaded, sometimes 
in very subtle ways, to support their case. Because 
of the unusual sequence of events surrounding the 
publication of this study (see conclusion) and the 
way evidence is presented (or not presented) in the 
book itself, we are inclined to examine their 
methods a bit more closely. 
3. SELECTION OF THE KEY OUTCOME: 
A COMPOSITE MEASURE OF STUDENT 
PERFORMANCE 
Distinguishing between student achievement and 
aptitude has been a longstanding concern among 
educational psychologists. Chubb and Moe’s own 
resolution of these nettlesome issues is to employ a 
composite of five sophomore year test scores 
collected in HS&B which they argue, “offers a 
suitable measure of student ability” (p. 116). The 
difference, however, on the same composite 
measure between sophomore and senior year, they 
declare is a highly reliable index of “total student 
achievement” (p. 71). Although Chubb and Moe 
often use the terms aptitude and achievement 
interchangeably, they ignore the fact that these are 
fundamentally different concepts. It is generally 
accepted that schools should be held accountable for 
the latter but not the former. 
We have argued elsewhere (Lee and Bryk, 1988) 
that the only valid measure in HS&B for studies of 
school effects on student achievement is the 
mathematics test. Mathematics is a core subject in 
high schools, unlike reading and vocabulary (two 
other HS&B tests) which generally are not directly 
taught. The content of the mathematics test also 
bears at least some relation to typical high school 
instructional objectives in grades 10-12, not 
generally true of the rest of the HS&B test battery. 
While other school effects researchers have taken a 
more liberal view on this point, virtually all eschew 
using an HS&B composite measure in favor of the 
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subject-by-subject analyses (Coleman et al., 1982; 
Gamoran, 1987; Hoffer et al., 1985). 
At base here is a simple but important idea. 
Student learning is not like the Gross National 
Product. There is no theoretical justification for a 
concept of “total student achievement” (p. 71) as 
rationalized by Chubb and Moe. Students learn 
individual subjects especially when they are taught 
those subjects.’ In our view, the composite measure 
is best viewed as a general ability indicator anal- 
ogous to an SAT score. While it surely contains 
some “school effect”, it is not a particularly sharp 
instrument for such investigations. Instead, the 
choice of the composite measure serves to tilt 
explanatory power in this study toward global school 
characteristics like autonomy and overall organiz- 
ation and away from specific instructional practice 
and aspects of teacher quality. 
In general, the quality of teachers and instruc- 
tional practices are quite variable within schools. As 
a result, these concerns typically require a specific 
subject matter and classroom focus to investigate 
them properly. HS&B data are inappropriate by 
design for such studies because HS&B reports no 
classroom level data. At best, it provides aggregate 
information at the school and teacher level which is 
of little value in studying the effects of classroom 
constructs, since enormous variation exists among 
teachers within schools and even for the same 
teachers among their various classroom assignments 
(Raudenbush et al., in press). Thus, the conclusions 
offered by Chubb and Moe that “the classrooms of 
successful and unsuccessful schools often differ very 
little. There is a remarkable sameness to the 
classrooms of America’s schools” (p. 96) are simply 
unwarranted. 
4. AN ODD METRIC: A LOG TRANSFORM OF 
AN IRT SCORE 
Typically, HS&B school effects studies have used 
raw test scores (i.e. the number of items correct) as 
the outcome variable metric. Through the use of a 
resealing technique, called item response theory or 
IRT (Lord, 1980; Hambleton, 1989), the differential 
difficulty, discriminating power and likelihood of 
correctly guessing various items are taken into 
account to form an interval scale measure. Basically, 
the IRT score is a non-linear transformation of the 
number of items correct, which has the effect of 
expanding the scale at its extremes. For example, 
one or two more items correct implies a much bigger 
change in IRT scores at the top of the scale than in 
the middle. A consequence of this resealing is that 
the estimated gains between sophomore and senior 
year for initially high achieving students will appear 
larger in an IRT metric than in the raw metric. In 
the Chubb and Moe analyses, this choice of metric 
favors private and suburban schools, whose students 
typically scored considerably higher on the sopho- 
more tests. 
Some controversy still surrounds the theory and 
use of IRT, but it has become increasingly common- 
place in major testing programs such as the National 
Assessment for Educational Progress. Although this 
metric is likely to work to the advantage of Chubb 
and Moe’s argument, its use is technically defens- 
ible. However, Chubb and Moe were apparently not 
satisfied with this metric and proceeded to transform 
the measures a second time. The acknowledged 
purpose for this second transformation was to adjust 
the estimated student “improvements for the level at 
which improvement begins” (p. 76), thereby 
expanding even further the size of the estimated 
gains in the initially high achieving schools as 
compared to more average schools. 
As noted above, an explicit purpose of IRT is to 
create an interval scale measure. This means that 
any difference among two IRT scores has the same 
meaning regardless of where they are located on the 
scale. Thus, a simple difference in IRT scores is a 
proper gain score metric. No statistical justification 
exists for further resealing the IRT scores to adjust 
for “the level at which improvement begins”. This 
is, however, another technical decision that tilts in 
favor of Chubb and Moe’s argument. 
In their defense, the authors might claim that the 
analyses reported in Chapter 4 takes into account 
this over-adjustment by introducing the 10th grade 
composite scores as a covariate to “adjust for initial 
ability”. The authors appear unaware that a gain 
score analysis controlling for the pre-measure is 
formally equivalent to simple analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) of the 12th grade scores controlling for 
the 10th grade measures.3 Thus, the end result of 
these various data manipulations is an ANCOVA 
but now where the outcome is in a transformed 
metric that favors advantaged schools. 
5. THE HIGH PERFORMING SCHOOLS: WHO 
ARE THEY? 
The ATS involved a sub-sample of about 400 
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schools from the larger HS&B survey. The various 
sampling procedures employed here result in a 
complicated set of design weights whose appropriate 
use is not always obvious, particularly in complex 
analyses as presented in this book. These problems 
are further amplified by some of the specific analytic 
strategies employed by Chubb and Moe. For 
example, the analyses in Chapter 3 use a post-hoc 
stratification into high- and low-performing schools, 
defined respectively as the top and bottom quartile 
on composite student achievement in the ATS 
sample. At best, the ATS school weights apply to 
the whole ATS sample.4 When a post-hoc stratifi- 
cation is imposed, as in this case, there is no 
assurance that the use of weights within quartiles 
provides representative data of high- and low- 
performing schools in the U.S.A., as claimed by 
Chubb and Moe. At a minimum, we should 
approach with caution descriptive comparisons 
based on the two extreme quartiles. 
Curiously, while these comparisons of high- and 
low-performing schools are an essential part of their 
argument about the probable causes of student 
achievement, some very basic facts about these 
groups are not reported in Chapter 3. Where are 
these schools located and how are they governed? In 
fact, it is not until the very end of their empirical 
work, late in Chapter 5, that private control and 
urban location are mentioned. From the results 
presented in Chapter 5, we infer that the high 
performing group consists of a melange of relatively 
large suburban schools and small private schools. 
(The latter accounts for the odd bimodal distri- 
bution reported in Table 4.2 for school size in the 
high performing group.) This subset of schools 
includes some very different organizational forms. 
At one extreme are the sophisticated suburban 
“shopping mall” high schools (Powell et al., 1985) 
with their large and diverse curricular offerings 
(which offer something here for everybody). At the 
other end, are small private schools addressing a 
unitary purpose (see for example, the core academic 
curricular emphases of Catholic high schools 
described by Bryk and Lee, 1988, 1989; Bryk and 
Lee, in press; Hill et al., 1990). Suburban high 
schools have among the highest levels of fiscal 
resources in the country, and some of the religious 
private schools among the fewest. 
These observations are not new. The distinctive- 
ness of the Catholic sector and other private sectors 
was well documented in the very first study using 
HS&B (Coleman et al., 1982). Evidence has 
accumulated that the structure of relations within 
schools varies as a function of school governance, 
school social class and other characteristics (see for 
example, Coleman et al., 1982; Lee and Bryk, 
1989). In ail likelihood, the mechanisms that pro- 
duce effectiveness in affluent suburban public 
schools are quite different from those at work in 
smaller religious private schools. Thus, it is just not 
sensible to lump these schools together. The homo- 
genization that results from this aggregation again 
works to mask the influence of differential internal 
organizational factors in favor of more macro 
external factors - another critical analytic decision 
that favors Chubb and Moe’s argument. 
6. ATHEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION 
AND MEASUREMENT OF SCHOOL 
ORGANIZATION 
The quality of school organization plays the 
central role in Chubb and Moe’s argument. 
Theorists such as Durkheim (1933, 1956, 1961), 
Dewey (1900, 1966, 1981) and Waller (1932) have 
brought attention to how roles, relationships and 
rules work in schools. Others such as Weber (1947), 
Parsons (1959) and Bidwell (1965) have written 
extensively about more macro aspects of school 
structures and norms. Taken together, this work 
affords a rich theoretical base for investigating how 
school organization might affect student learning. 
Unfortunately, little of this theory is employed by 
Chubb and Moe in their measure constructed for the 
school organization concept which they describe as a 
key measure in their work (p. 120). 
Instead, Chubb and Moe pursue a more empirical 
approach. They consider a range of organizational 
characteristics that might be related to student 
performance including school goals, principal 
leadership, personnel quality and selected instruc- 
tional practices. The features identified as differing 
between low-performance and high-performance 
schools were combined to create two composite 
indices of school organization: a comprehensive 
index with 10 components, several of which are 
themselves composites; and a condensed index with 
seven components. The rationale for creating the 
condensed index from the comprehensive index was 
also largely empirical. The condensed measure 
worked better than the comprehensive measure as a 
predictor of student achievement. 
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Of particular significance, the atheoretical ap- 
proach employed by Chubb and Moe leads them to 
include in both the comprehensive and condensed 
indices two components which are not organiz- 
ational properties but rather organizational conse- 
quences. Specifically, two of the three components 
used to measure teacher professionalism - teacher 
efficacy (itself a composite of two items) and teacher 
absenteeism (a composite of four items) - are 
generally viewed as teacher outcomes (see for 
example, Bryk and Driscoll, 1988; Newman et al., 
1989; Lee et al., 1991; Raudenbush et al., 1992). 
The inclusion of these outcomes within the measure 
of school organization is not inconsequential. 
Previous research (Ashton and Webb, 1986; Rosen- 
holtz, 1989; Firestone and Rosenblum, 1989) has 
demonstrated that these teacher outcomes are 
interconnected with student outcomes including 
academic achievement. While teacher efficacy and 
absenteeism comprise important dimensions of both 
the comprehensive and condensed versions of the 
school organization measure, the problem is 
especially serious in the condensed measure, since 
there are fewer other components. It seems likely 
that the stronger effects reported for the condensed 
than for the comprehensive measure (e.g. compare 
results in Tables 4-10 and 4-11) on gains in 
achievement are explainable by the larger influence 
of the two inappropriate components in the con- 
densed version of the variable. In essence, Chubb 
and Moe have included school outcomes in defining 
their central predictor of school outcomes. 
Moreover, in moving from the comprehensive to 
the condensed measure, an important dimension of 
school organization - teacher collegiality - was 
excluded. The authors justify this decision on the 
grounds that this was ‘clearly the most subjective 
indicator of organization in the original measure” 
(p. 136). Other recent research using the same 
HS&B data has reported significant relationships 
with teacher collegiality and concluded that it is an 
important dimension of school organization (Bryk 
and Driscoll, 1988; Bryk and Lee, in press; Bryk et 
al., 1990; Newmann et al., 1989; Lee et al., 1991). In 
sum, Chubb and Moe’s condensed measure of 
school organization includes two inappropriate 
components (teacher efficacy and teacher absentee- 
ism) and excludes one (teacher collegiality) that 
should be there. As such, the index suffers from a 
lack of construct validity - it does not measure 
what it purports to measure (Cook and Campbell, 
1979). 
7. UNDER-REPRESENTING THE EFFECTS OF 
ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION 
The proportion of students in the academic 
curriculum track is the most important component 
in the two organizational indices mentioned above. 
It has the strongest individual relationship to student 
achievement. This component is described by 
Chubb and Moe as “gauging the educational prac- 
tices of the school - in particular, how students are 
assigned to classes and what takes place in those 
classes” (p. 122). In analyses which investigate the 
influence of the school organization index on 
student achievement, the estimated effects are 
dramatically reduced once the proportion of 
students in the academic track is removed from the 
overall measure (compare Table 4-l vs Table 4-10 
for the entire student sample; Tables D-l vs D-4 
for public school students only). The magnitude of 
the coefficient associated with the proportion of 
students in the academic track in Table 4-10 and D- 
4 actually exceeds that of the residual school 
organization measure with tracking removed.5 
Moreover, we contend that the true impact of a 
school’s academic organization on academic 
achievement is under-represented by Chubb and 
Moe. Recent field research has reported the 
decreased salience of curriculum tracking in high 
schools, where a large array of courses of varying 
content and difficulty now represents current prac- 
tice (see, for example, Powell et al., 1985). Studies 
investigating school effects on student achievement 
have been quite consistent in demonstrating that the 
most important single factor is the courses students 
have taken in the particular curricular area being 
tested. Similarly, our extensive work comparing the 
organizations of Catholic and public high schools 
(Bryk and Lee, in press; Lee and Bryk, 1988, 1989) 
has demonstrated the primary role of academic 
organization in explaining the advantageous out- 
comes (higher achievement and a more equitable 
distribution of achievement) evidenced by students 
in Catholic high schools. The schools are character- 
ized by a constrained set of largely academic 
offerings which is taken by all students, regardless 
of academic or social backgrounds. To be sure, this 
advantageous academic organization means that a 
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larger proportion of students is in the academic 
track. However, the largest advantages for Catholic 
school students compared to their public school 
counterparts, in terms of both academic course- 
taking and achievement, actually accrue for students 
in the non-academic tracks. This confirms that it is 
the courses students take which make the differ- 
ence, not just their track placement. 
In sum, Chubb and Moe failed to adequately 
measure the single most important component of 
school organization - the actual academic experi- 
ences of students - even though these data exist in 
HS&B and have been extensively analyzed by other 
researchers. This analytic decision, not to use 
specific course taking data in favor of a more global 
measure, is the organizational parallel to the 
decision discussed earlier to use a composite 
measure of student achievement. In both cases, by 
relying on global measures, the explanatory power 
of their model tilts towards more general factors 
external to the school - still more critical decisions 
favoring the Chubb and Moe argument. 
8. SINGLE-LEVEL METHODS AND A MULTI- 
LEVEL CONCEPTUALIZATION 
As noted earlier, the central proposition under 
research by Chubb and Moe, that properties of 
school organization and their external environment 
affect the learning that occurs within schools, is 
multi-level. That is, it involves concepts defined at 
both the school and student levels and seeks to trace 
the relations across the two levels. The problems of 
multi-level analysis - misestimated standard errors, 
confounding of within- and between-unit relations, 
and failure to model heterogeneity of within-unit 
relations - have been well-documented (for a 
thorough review see Burstein, 1980). Fortunately, 
more appropriate statistical models for this phenom- 
enon have emerged in the last 10 years, called 
multilevel analysis (Mason et al., 1983; Goldstein, 
1987) and elsewhere termed hierarchical linear 
models (Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986; Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992). These new techniques resolve 
longstanding methodological difficulties, and their 
use is rapidly becoming common place (see, for 
example, the edited volume of educational appli- 
cations by Raudenbush and Willms, 1991). Chubb 
and Moe, however, have relied exclusively on the 
more questionable single-level analyses. 
Specifically, their key results derive from student- 
level analyses of academic performance where a 
number of student characteristics are entered as 
controls. It has been previously well-documented 
that these relations are not homogenous across 
schools (see for example, Coleman et al., 1982; Lee 
and Bryk, 1989). Ignoring this heterogeneity, as 
Chubb and Moe do, introduces a potential bias in 
interpreting school effects. That is, when schools 
affect students differentially and the structure of 
these “within-school effects” varies across schools, 
then the “average effects” estimated by the Chubb 
and Moe model can be misleading. From the 
perspective of analysis of variance models, this is 
tantamount to interpreting main effects and ignoring 
the presence of significant interactions. At a mini- 
mum, Chubb and Moe should have explicitly 
recognized the previously demonstrated sector 
differences (public vs Catholic vs other private 
schools) in their single-level models and explored 
possible interaction effects as a function of sector. 
This problem is further exacerbated by the 
weighting scheme deployed by Chubb and Moe. 
Since their key analyses are student-level, they use 
the regular HS&B student-level design weights. 
However, these weights do not apply to the sub- 
sample of students in the ATS schools, only to the 
full HS&B design (the ATS is not a simple random 
sample of HS&B). Further, the statistical evidence 
that bears most directly on the authors’ central 
claims involves the relation of school characteristics 
to adjusted mean achievement differences among 
schools. These are school-level relations and the 
proper weights here are the ATS school weights, not 
the HS&B student weights. 
Short of reanalyzing the actual variables con- 
structed by Chubb and Moe, it is impossible to 
determine whether the choice of weights works for 
or against their argument. It is clear, however, that 
the choice can have significant consequences. To 
illustrate this, we present results from a small 
analysis problem, using a subset of HS&B data that 
simulates the basic features of the Chubb and Moe 
research - a combination of student and school- 
level measures predicting 12th grade mathematics 
achievement.6 (See Table 1 for a description of the 
sample and variables). We analyzed these data at 
the student-level using both the HS&B student and 
school weights. The student-level effects reported in 
Table 2 are quite similar for the different weighting 
conditions. The school-level effects, which parallel 
those of prime interest to Chubb and Moe, however, 
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Sample - drawn from the base-year and first follow-up HS&B 
Schools 
All Catholic schools (N = 83) 
Random sample of public schools (N = 95) 
Students 
All HS&B students within these schools who were sophomores in 1980 and seniors in 1982 
2050 Catholic school students 
1883 public school students 
Oversampling (from HS&B) 
33 oversampled Catholic schools (containing high proportions of either blacks or Cuban Hispanics) 
12 high-Hispanic enrollment public schools 
45 of 178 schools are from oversampled strata 
Measures 
Outcome 
Senior-year mathemetics achtevement (FYMTHIFS) 
Predictors 
Social class (BUSES) 
Minority status (from sophomore-year measures of race and ethnicity, 1 = black or Hispanic, 0 = everyone else). 
Sector (1 = Catholic, 0 = public) 
Average school SES (aggregated from BYSES) 
% Mmority in school (aggregated from minority status) 
Interaction terms 
SES x AVSES (product term) 
MINORITY X %MINORITY (product term, with the minority dummy variable effects coded, 1 = minority, 
-1 = non-minority) 
HS&B, High school and beyond. 





Raw student weights 
PI 
Raw school weights 
[31 





Average school SES 
% Minority in school 
Contextual variables 
SES x average SES 
Minority x % minority in school 

























*The regression coefficients presented here are unstandardized. The dependent variable is a mathematics achievement 
test, containing 38 items. The overall mean (unweighted) of the test for this sample is 20.9, and the standard deviation is 
7.7. 
are different. The Catholic sector effect with school- 45%! Differences of this magnitude are sufficient to 
level weighting is 10% smaller, the effect of school alter conclusions about the significance of school 
social class is almost 20% smaller, and the effect of effect such as the results Chubb and Moe report for 
percentage minority enrollment increased by about school organization. As this evidence about school 
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organization is critical to their argument, an 
improper choice of weights could result in the whole 
argument collapsing. 
9. ANOMALOUS SCHOOL SIZE RESULTS 
Other school organization studies, using these 
same data, have found that school size is a powerful 
predictor of the nature of the social organization 
found in American high schools (Bryk and Driscoll, 
1988; Driscoll, 1989; Newmann et al., 1989). Similar 
results have also been reported in other data. For 
example, in a recent study of Chicago school reform 
(Easton et al., 1991)) teachers in small schools were 
much more likely to characterize their work con- 
ditions in positive terms. From a theoretical per- 
spective, the influence of organizational size on 
bureaucratization has been forcefully argued by 
Weber and others. Thus, school size represents an 
important rival hypothesis to governance control for 
understanding organizational effectiveness. 
In Table 5.1, Chubb and Moe describe schools 
with effective organizations as being somewhat 
smaller, although they argue that the size of these 
differences is not meaningful. The basis for this 
conclusion is again a comparison of characteristics of 
schools in two extreme quartiles, in this case on a 









weighting issue noted above, along with the failure 
to directly represent school sector (public vs private) 
in these analyses, may account for these anomalous 
results. 
In fact, the results for school size reported in 
Table 5.1 are likely to be especially sensitive to the 
weighting issue because schools were selected in the 
original HS&B design with probability proportional 
to size within a number of different strata. As a 
result, the corresponding school design weights 
strongly depend on school size (this is illustrated in 
Fig. 1). Consequently, if the weighting is not 
properly applied, the estimated effect of school size 
may be misleading. 
On balance, Chubb and Moe would probably 
point us to their final analysis, presented in Table 
5.7, of a school-level regression predicting effective 
school organization. In this analysis, school size 
does have a significant effect, but in the opposite 
direction (i.e. bigger schools appear better). Why 
and how this reversal of effect occurs, however, goes 
without comment.’ Such a reversal can only be 
caused by a relationship between school size and 
one or more of the other predictors included in the 
model. The key to sorting out these effects is to 
watch the school size coefficient as other predictors 
are individually entered. Presumably, the reversal 
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School enrollment size 
Figure 1. Distribution of school weights by school enrollment size, for regularly and oversampled 
schools in the Administrator Teacher Subset of High School and Beyond. 
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measures are added. If this speculation is correct, it 
would reinforce the argument that organizational 
size powerfully shapes work life within schools. It 
implies that the prevalence of bureaucratic con- 
straints is related to the basic structure of the 
organizations to be managed - large public high 
schools - and not simply to the way they are 
governed. That is, the structure of individual schools 
and the norms that have built up around this 
structure drives, at least in part, the emergence of 
bureaucratic constraints. 
Such results would lead us in a very different 
policy direction. We would focus much more 
attention on the big school as an organizational 
problem, and on districts where large schools are 
especially prevalent, e.g. our major cities. Smailer 
school units and greater decentralization of 
responsibility would appear as promising initiatives. 
10. MARKETS OR ENHANCED DKMO~~TIC 
CONTROL: WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE 
ACTUALLY SUPPORT? 
Although it is obscured, Chubb and Moe actually 
provide supposing evidence that could be 
interpreted as supporting an argument for enhanced 
local control and decentralization, particularly in 
our large cities. They report in Table 5.11 that no 
parental attribute, including social class, has an 
independent effect on the prevalence of adminis- 
trative and personnel constraints (their two measures 
of bureaucracy and lack of school autonomy). As a 
result, they state that “schools may be given the 
freedom to make their own decisions about 
personnel, cu~iculum, instruction and discipline 
even when their clienteles are not well educated” (p. 
177). In further interpreting these results just four 
pages later, however, they contradict this evidence 
to conclude “market control tends to promote 
autonomy through its natural operation, while 
democratic control tends to allow for it only under 
the most favorable circumstances - outside of 
urban areas with able aud interested students and 
parents”. Their evidence says that parental back- 
ground does not affect school autonomy. Yet, when 
arguing for how to promote such autonomy, Chubb 
and Moe suddenly reverse directions and imply that 
it does. 
Pursuing this a bit further, Chubb and Moe report 
in Table 5.12 that urban location has the biggest 
effect on the level of administrative and personnel 
constraints, with private control the second most 
important (Table 5.11 also has these as the two most 
important predictors, although in the reverse 
order’). In fact, the urban location effect is probably 
underestimated because it is likely that this effect is 
almost exclusively in the public sector, resulting 
from differences between big, unresponsive urban 
school systems and client-sensitive suburban 
districts (there is no reason why the level of 
bureaucratic constraints in private schools should 
depend on urban location, because private schools 
governance arrangements are similar across 
locations). 
We conjecture that if the urban location effect 
was estimated separately for public and private 
schools, the urban location effect for public schools 
would be much larger, probably dwarfing the 
private school effect. If this proved to be the case, it 
would appear then that bureaucratic constraints 
and ineffective school organization are p~ncipally 
an urban public school problem and not a more 
general democratic governance problem. Suddenly, 
the Chubb and Moe results begin to look more like 
an argument for radical decentralization of urban 
public schools in order to jolt bureaucratic calcifi- 
cation and revitalize democratic control! 
Most troubling of all, in the final modeling of 
effective school organization, reported only a few 
pages later, where Chubb and Moe seek to establish 
the last component of their argument-that private 
control is the key influence on organizational 
effectiveness - the urban location variable is not 
even included as a potential predictor. Yet another 
technical decision was made that works strongly in 
favor of the authors’ argument. Chubb and Moe 
clearly have a personal preference for market 
control. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that the 
empirical evidence does. 
11. SUNNY AND ~ONCL~~~ REX4RKS 
It is important that the reader understands the 
perspective we have brought to this critique. We 
have published considerable research on Catholic 
schools, most of which reflects quite positively on 
these schools. In our forthcoming book on this 
topic, we also speak quite favorably about school 
autonomy and how this can promote more effective 
institutions. Thus, in some important ways we cross- 
validate aspects of Chubb and Moe’s results and 
support at least components of their argument. 
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Nonetheless, we have taken a highly critical stance 
in this review. We have found Politics, Markets, and 
America’s Schools lacking as a piece of disciplined 
inquiry on an important matter of public policy. 
Further, we judge its recommendations, although of 
some value, to be substantially overdrawn. 
Disciplined Inquiry or Policy Argument? 
Taken in total, the empirical argument traced out 
by Chubb and Moe has a hidden circularity. They 
begin by identifying high performing schools, but 
neglect to tell us that these schools are dispro- 
portionately private. To help their case, they doubly 
transform the student outcome metric, which further 
enhances the likelihood of private schools appearing 
in the high performing group. They then proceed to 
identify the organizational concomitants of high 
performance, which has now largely become a code 
word for private. Ignoring extant theory of school 
organization, they empirically pick the best com- 
ponents (best in the sense that they maximally 
predict high performance) to define effective 
organization, and then eventually lead us to the 
conclusion that private control is the key predictor 
of such organizations. Finally, when urban location 
emerges as a complicating factor, they conveniently 
ignore it. So they started with private, and low and 
behold ended up with private! 
We also find troublesome the way this infor- 
mation was released to the public. The policy 
argument appeared in the Public Interest some 2 
years before any scientific scrutiny was possible. 
Clearly this was going to be an important and 
controversial book which had the potential to 
substantially affect public policy. With the 
imprimatur of the Brookings Institution and its 
Washington, DC publication context, this potential 
was further heightened. It would seem reasonable to 
expect that careful scientific scrutiny would at least 
accompany the public policy debate. Yet, no 
statistical analyses were to be seen anywhere. 
Instead, the best various researchers could do was 
comment on the analytic plan described in the 
Public Interest article. It now appears that, based on 
these early criticisms, some further analyses were 
undertaken by Chubb and Moe to protect the core 
argument against criticism, but nowhere is this 
acknowledged. While the authors have striven for 
maximal public impact, it is far clearer that they 
have equally attended to the engagement of their 
scientific colleagues in debate over the merits and 
interpretation of the evidence. This is a crafty policy 
argument, but it is not disciplined inquiry.g 
The Evidence for Markets in Education 
There is, in fact, considerable statistical evidence 
documenting internal organizational difference 
between public and private schools.” The effective 
organizational practices, as discussed by Chubb and 
Moe, have been linked to greater school autonomy 
found in the private sector. However - and this is 
important to note - there is little empirical 
evidence that the effective organizational practices 
thought to accrue from greater autonomy actually 
foster student achievement.” Moreover, the 
validity of the evidence presented by Chubb and 
Moe on this point is doubtful for various reasons 
discussed above. While the lack of empirical 
evidence does not necessarily imply that schooling 
could not be improved through increased autonomy, 
it does suggest a closer look at the logic at work 
here. 
Choice advocates argue that in a market system of 
control, competition will motivate schools to be 
more responsive to the needs of their current and 
potential clients. These arguments typically cite 
research documenting the effectiveness of private 
schools to support their claims. It is important to be 
very clear, however, about what this research 
shows. Many of the effective organizational 
practices identified by Chubb and Moe are actually 
more prevalent among non-Catholic than Catholic 
schools (Chubb and Moe, 1988). On the other hand, 
many of the positive outcomes described in the 
research comparing public and private schools are 
actually more typical of Catholic schools, which 
comprise about two-thirds of the ATS private school 
sample (Moles, 1988). For example, the more 
equitable social distribution of achievement, or 
“common school” effect (Coleman et al., 1982), 
typifies Catholic schools but not other private 
schools. Similarly, the reduced dropout rates and 
unusual effectiveness of Catholic high schools for 
disadvantaged youth are not characteristic of private 
schools in general (Coleman and Hoffer, 1987). The 
specific effectiveness of Catholic girls’ schools (Lee 
and Bryk, 1986; Riordan, 1990) also does not 
appear to generalize across the private sector as a 
whole (Lee and Marks, 1991). 
In sum, existing research clearly indicates differ- 
ences among private schools in both their internal 
organizations and in the outcomes which accrue 
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from these organizational differences. This raises 
doubts about a blanket claim that a move toward 
greater privatization will accrue better conse- 
quences for students. As we have looked more 
closely at Catholic schools in an attempt to better 
understand how their organization might contribute 
to their unusual effectiveness, three key character- 
istics stand out. First is the constrained academic 
organization, discussed earlier, where common 
academic aims are held for all students regardless of 
background or future plans. The second character- 
istic focuses on the larger social organization in 
which the academic structure is embedded. Catholic 
schools tend toward a communal organization. They 
are smaller schools which promote more common 
experiences. The work of teachers is less specialized 
and more cooperative, and social relations are 
typified by informal and frequent face-to-face inter- 
actions among adults and students (the school life 
engendered in such communal organizations con- 
trasts sharply with that found in the more bureau- 
cratic structures typical of large, urban public 
secondary schools). Third, a distinctive set of shared 
values animates schooling. Much in the daily life of 
Catholic schools symbolizes fundamental beliefs 
about individual dignity and a shared responsibility 
for advancing a just and caring society. An edu- 
cational philosophy and practice aligned with these 
ideals helps promote social equity. We argue that 
this specific belief system, and not just any set of 
shared values, is required for the positive outcomes 
observed in these schools. 
In sum, we must attend to the specific ideology at 
work in private schools if we are to understand the 
effects they produce. More attention must focus on 
the actual content of the values operative in schools, 
and the consequences linked to these values. In this 
regard, there is little evidence in our research on 
Catholic schools to substantiate the traditional 
micro-economic idea of human behavior motivated 
by entrepreneurial interest. While the competitive 
spirit, implied in a market system of incentives, may 
fuel economic development, it seems unlikely to 
engender the caring human relations and shared 
social responsibility so essential to institutions of 
human betterment. 
NOTES 
1. For a more extensive discussion of methodological weaknesses in Chubb and Moe see an earlier 
review by Witte (1990). For an insightful critique of the quality of their argument as policy analysis see 
Elmore (1991). We are indebted to both Witte and Elmore as they have helped to illuminate the path 
that we have followed in this review. 
2. Recent school research has demonstrated that the exposure to subject matter is an important 
determinant of what students actually do learn. Further, these opportunities to learn various subjects 
are differentially afforded to students in different kinds of schools. As a result, school effects research 
has increasingly defined subject matter as a factor that must be included in the study design 
(McLaughlin et al., 1990). 
3. The actual analysis may be a bit more complex than just described. It appears that Chubb and Moe 
used the second transformation to create the gain scores but used the IRT measure for the pre-test. If 
this is correct, the relationship between the Chubb and Moe analysis and a simple ANCOVA becomes 
more complex. Nevertheless, our basic conclusion still holds. 
4. Because of the complexities introduced here, serious questions were raised within the National 
Center for Educational Statistics as to whether adequate design weights could be even determined for 
this data subset. While arguably the ATS school weights provide a representative sample of schools, 
the HS&B student weights, employed by Chubb and Moe in their kev student outcome analyses, __ . 
appropriately apply only to the full HS&B data and not the ATS subset. 
5. In fact, for the samnle of uublic school students (Table D-4). the coefficient for the comurehensive 
measure’ of school organization (0.009) does not meet the conventional two-tailed sfandard of 
statistical significance, since the magnitude of the coefficient is not twice its standard error (0.005). 
Throughout their analyses, Chubb and Moe have used the more liberal one-tailed tests of stastical 
significance (t > 1.64 for P < 0.05). It is difficult to see how a combined set of directional hypotheses 
- the assumption of one-tailed tests - is actually justifiable in the analyses throughout the book. 
6. For a further discussion of these results see a technical report by Bryk and Lee (1986) available by 
writing to the authors. Also, for a more general discussion in the context of multi-level models see 
Raudenbush and Bryk (1992). 
7. A similar result, using these same data, was previously reported by Bryk and Driscoll(l988) in their 
study of the effects of school organization on teacher commitment and student engagement. Upon 
closer scrutiny of their analyses, Bryk and Driscoll surmise that two offsetting phenomena were at 
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work: the greater prevalence of communal organization in small schools, and the enhanced 
opportunities for work specialization (for teachers to do their own thing) especially in relatively large 
suburban high schools. 
8. We are puzzled by the differences reported in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 for the urban location and 
private control variables. Assuming both are dummy variables with the same coding scheme (e.g. a 1 
indicating membership in the construct category and 0 elsewhere), then the percentile differences 
reported in Table 5.12 should be a simple monotonic transformation of the regression coefficients in 
Table 5.11. Curiously, however, they are not. The authors imply in the text that these discrepancies 
result from the unusual distribution of the outcome variable, but this distribution applies equally in 
transforming the effects of both the urban location and private control variables. It is not clear how 
this accounts for the differences reported in these two tables. 
9. For some reason, comparative research on public and private schools seems plagued by this 
problem. See an earlier essay review by Bryk (1981) for a further elaboration of this distinction 
between policy argument and disciplined inquiry. 
10. For an interpretative review of this evidence as it bears on high school organization and its effects, 
see Bryk et al. (1990). 
11. Bryk and Driscoll (1988) and Bryk and Lee (in press) demonstrate that the social organization of 
schools is strongly linked to teacher commitment and student engagement. Further, it is reasonable to 
believe that this greater willingness to sustain effort in more engaging institutions indirectly affects 
achievement [Bryk and Driscoll(l988) do provide some evidence on this point]. Ultimately, however, 
student achievement principally results from the interaction of students with teachers in classrooms 
around subject matter. Any adequate explanation of how organizational properties affect student 
achievement must postulate a mechanism that incorporates classroom life. 
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